University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1919

National Police Power under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution
Robert Eugene Cushman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Cushman, Robert Eugene, "National Police Power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution" (1919). Minnesota Law Review.
2184.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2184

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

THE NATIONAL POLICE'POWER

THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER
UNDER THE

COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION*
II.

REGULATIONS BARRING THE USE OF INTERSTATE COTMFERCE
AS A CONDUIT FOR INJURIOUS COMMODITIES AND

AN AID IN ILLICIT TRANSACTIONS

ALTyiOUci Congress in its efforts to protect the national
health, morals, and general welfare has been compelled to use a

process of indirection and has had to do good not merely by
stealth but by subterfuge, the result has been that, under its
specific grants of power to regulate interstate commerce, to tax,
and to maintain a postal system, Congress has succeeded in laying a compelling or restraining hand upon numerous abuses, has

wrestled with a considerable variety of economic and social problems, and has, accordingly, exercised a police power that has been
real and substantial. By far the greatest number of those acts
of Congress, which, even though labeled interstate commerce or
tax or postal regulations, are really police enactments in disguise,
have been passed under the authority to regulate commerce; a
group of these, those passed to protect interstate commerce from
danger or obstruction, have been discussed in the previous portion of this article. There remain still to be discussed three
main groups of police regulations passed under the sanction of
the commerce clause: those forbidding the use of interstate commerce as a channel for transactions that menace the national
health, morals, or general welfare; those passed to co-operate
with the states by forbidding the use of the facilities of interstate commerce for the purpose of evading or violating state
police regulations: and finally the Child-Labor Law, by which
Cofigress sought to deny the privileges of interstate commerce
to articles produced under conditions of which Congress did not
approve.
*

Continued

from 3 Nx.soTA LAw REvIEw 319.
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It has been made clear that Congress has full right under its
power "to regulate commerce ....
among the several
states" to protect that commerce from danger and obstruction;
and the Supreme Court has found it possible to uphold the
Employers' Liability Act as necessary to protect commerce from
railway accidents, and the Adamson Eight-Hour Law as necessary to keep commerce from being obstructed. But if Congress
were limited in its power over interstate commerce merely to the
protection of that commerce, then a good many abuses and
dangers arising from or augmented by interstate commerce would
be left unremedied. But Congress has not felt itself so circumscribed. It has regarded as a. proper use of its authority over
commerce not only the protection of commerce itself but also
the protection of the public from the misuse of that commerce.
One of the most interesting and important steps in the development of a national police -power under the commerce clause has
been the enactment of a group of laws by which the channels of
interstate commerce have been closed to commodities or transactions which are injurious, not to that commerce or to any of
the agencies or facilities thereof, but to the health, morals, safety,
and general welfare of the nation. When Congress punishes
the man who ships across a state line bottles of colored water
declared by their labels to be a cure for cancer, it does so not
because those bottles are a whit more dangerous to commerce
than would be a consignment of shoes, but because it desires to
prevent the facilities of commerce from being used as a means of
distributing goods which are a fraud upon the people who buy
and use them. When Congress makes it a felony to transport
a woman from one state to another for immoral purposes, it does
so not because it is more dangerous or injurious to an interstate
carrier to carry a prostitute than to carry a clergyman, but
because it is undesirable to have interstate carriers used as tools
or agencies by those engaged in the white slave traffic.
There ought to be no difficulty in concluding that the authority
to pass such laws is reasonably implied from the plenary power of
Congress to regulate commerce. When a man is given charge
of a gun or an axe he is expected not merely to keep it in repair
and protect it from damage; he is expected also to see that it is
not placed at the disposal of those who desire to use it in committing murder or in destroying other people's property. Whatever controversy may arise as to the power of Congress to pro-
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hibit or restrict under certain circumstances the shipment in
interstate commerce of commodities which are legitimate and
wholesome and are destined foi" legitimate and wholesome uses,
there ought to be no serious doubt about the congressional
authority to keep "the arteries of interstate commerce from
being employed as conduits for articles hurtful to the public
health, safety, or morals."'The police regulations thus enacted by Congress to prevent
the use of commerce for improper. purposes may be grouped
under three heads: first, those designed to protect the public
morals; second, those aimed to protect the public health; third,
those intended to protect the public from deception and fraud.
Each of these groups may be considered briefly.
1. Acts Under the Commerce Clause Protecting Public
Morals. (a) Exclusion of Lottery Tickets: It would be difficult
to point to any problem about which the moral judgment of the
American people has changed so radically and in so short a time
as it has in respect to lotteries. During the first few decades
of our history lotteries were looked upon as perfectly proper
forms of private enterprise, and even as useful fiscal agencies for
augmenting the revenue of the state and nation.' At the present
time lotteries are thoroughly and almost universally discredited;
and rigorous provisions prohibiting them are to be found on the
statute books and even in the constitutions of a great majority
of the states.3 In 1895 Congress lent its aid to the cause of the
suppression of lotteries by passing an act which prohibited the
introduction or the carriage of lottery tickets in the United States
mails or in interstate commerce. 4 This interesting statute was
apparently passed with two purposes in view. One purpose was
the desire to strike a blow indirectly, through the power of Congress over interstate commerce and the mails, at an evil over
which the constitution of the United States gave Congress no
direct authority. A second purpose was to prevent the anti1This apt phrase is borrowed from ihe brilliant article by Senator Knox
on Development of the Federal Power to Regulate Commerce. See 17 Yale
Law Jour. 135 (1908).
2An elaborate account of this is to be found in an article by A. R. Spofford, Lotteries in American History, Annual Rep. of Amer. Hist. Assoc.,
1892.
3An exhaustive analysis of these state provisions and the cases construing them is to be found in Homer v. United States, (1893) 147 U. S.449,
13 S.C. R. 409, 37 L. Ed. 237. At present probably every American state

forbids them. 17 R. C. L 1212.
March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 963. This now forms Sec. 237 of the
criminal code of the United States, March 9, 1909, 35 Stat. at L.1136.
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lottery statutes of the various states from being rendered ineffective by permitting the introduction of lottery tickets into the
states through interstate commerce and the mails, channels beyond the reach of the police power of any state legislature.
It was not until 1903 that the Supreme Court of the United
States passed upon the constitutionality of the Lottery Act.5 So
important and difficult did the court regard the problems involved
that it had the case argued three times before rendering its final
decision, and then decided-it by a vote of five to four. Some of
the most distinguished members of the American bar appeared
on the brief attacking the statute. Two distinct questions were
raised in this case: first, are lottery tickets commodities or articles
of commerce within the meaning of the. constitution; second,
granted that they are, does the power which Congress possesses
to "regulate" commerce include the power to prohibit commerce
in such commodities?
The court answered both these questions in the affirmative.
It decided, first, that lottery tickets are articles of commerce,
and, second, that their exclusion from interstate commerce is a
proper exercise of the power to regulate that commerce.. *While
it is unnecessary to the present discussion to comment upon the
first of these questions, it will be interesting to examine briefly
the reasons which led the majority of the court to this second
conclusion. "In the first place," declared the court, speaking
through ir. justice Harlan, "in determining whether regulation
may not under some circumstances properly take the form or
have the effect of prohibition, the nature of the interstate traffic
which it was sought by the act of March 2, 1895, to suppress,
cannot be overlooked." Then follow the views of the court upon
the menace of lotteries. Quoting from one of its previous decisions, it asserted that "Experience has shown that the common
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in
contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former
are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests
the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every
class: it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; it plunders
5 The Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), (1903) 188 U. S. 321, 23
S. C. R. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492. This case involved only the validity of the
exclusion of lottery tickets from interstate commerce: their exclusion from
the mails had been sustained in earlier decisions. See infra pp. 386-387
and note 7.
G Phalen v.Virginia, (1849) 8 How. (U. S.) 163. 168, 12 L. Ed. 1030.
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the ignorant and simple." The second step in the court's argument is that Congress by virtue of its plenary power to regulate
commerce among the states may "provide that such commerce
shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets" unless
some constitutional restriction can be found to stand in the way.
"What clause," inquires Mr. Justice Harlan, "can be cited which,
in any degree, countenances the suggestion that one may, of right,
carry or cause to be carried from one state to another that which
will harm the public morals?" The only possible clause of the
constitution which might be so invoked is that which forbids
the deprivation of any person's liberty without due process of
law. "But surely it will not be said to be a part of anyone's
liberty, as recognized by the supreme law of the land, that he
shall be allowed to introduce into commerce among the states
an element that will be confessedly injurious to the public morals.
It is a kind of traffic which no one can be entitled to
pursue as of right." In the third place, the court disposes of
the contention that the Lottery Act, by establishing regulations
of the internal affairs of the several states, violated the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves to the states or to the people all
powers not delegated to the United States. The court held, to
begin with, that this contention overlooks the fact that the Lottery
Act is a regulation of commerce and that the power to regulate
commerce is specifically given to Congress by the constitution.
But, aside from that, the act does not purport to suppress the
traffic in lottery tickets which is carried on entirely within the
limits of a state, but only that traffic which is interstate. Furthermore, instead of invading the proper field of police regulation
and usurping the powers of control over the morals of the people
of the state"Congress only supplemented the action of those statesperhaps all of them-which, for the protection of the public
morals, prohibit the drawing of lotteries, as well as the sale or
circulation of lottery tickets, within their respective limits. It
said, in effect, -that it wofuld not permit the declared policy of
the states, which sought to protect their people against the mischiefs of the lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded
by the agency of interstate commerce. We should hesitate long
before adjudging that an evil of such appalling character, carried
on through interstate commerce, cannot be met and crushed by
the ofnly power competent to that end. We say competent to
that end, because Congress alone has the power to occupy, by
legislation, the whole field of interstate commerce."
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After noticing as precedents or analogies some of the other
instances in which congressional regulations of commerce have
taken the form of prohibition,-namely, the prohibition of the
interstate transportation of diseased cattle, the prohibitions comprising the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the prohibition resulting
from the operation of the Wilson Act of 1890, which subjected
to state police control interstate shipments of liquor upon their
arrival within the state-the court takes particular pains to make
clear the limited scope of this important decision. This case
does not at all establish the right of Congress to "exclude from
commerce among the states any article, commodity, or thing.
of whatever kind or nature, or however useful or valuable.
which it may choose, no matter with what motive.
."
The court will consider such arbitrary exclusions from interstate commerce only when it is necessary to do so. "The whole
subject is too important, and the questions suggested by its consideration are too difficult of solution to justify any attempt to
lay down a rule for determining in advance the validity of every
statute that may be enacted under the commerce clause. We decide
nothing more in the present case than that lottery tickets are subjects of traffic among those who choose to sell or buy them: that
the carriage of such tickets by independent carriers from one
state to another is therefore interstate commerce: that under its
power to regulate commerce among the several states Congresssubject to the limitations imposed by the constitution upon the
exercise of the powers granted-has plenary authority over such
commerce, and may prohibit the carriage of such tickets from
state to state: and that legislation to that end, and of that character, is not inconsistent with any limitation or restriction imposed
upon the exercise of the powers granted to Congress."
The Lotter, Case was decided by a divided court with four
justices dissenting. The dissenting opinion, written by Chief
Justice Fuller, was based on the conviction of the minority that
lottery tickets were not articles of commerce and that, even if
they were, the power to regulate interstate commerce does niot
carry with it the absolute power to prohibit the transportation
of articles of commerce. It was pointed out that when the court
held that exclusion of lottery tickets from the mails was a proper
exercise of the power of Congress over the postal system it had
been expressly said that Cofigress did not have the power to exclude from transportation in interstate commerce articles which
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it might properly exclude from the mails.- This dissent is also
interesting because it specifically states that Congress does not
have as extensive power over interstate commerce as it does over
foreign afld Indian commerce. "There is no reservation of police
power or any other to a foreign nation or to an Indian tribe,
and the scope of the power is not the same as that over interstate
commerce." Consequently the instances in which Congress has
excluded various articles from importation or from traffic with
the Indian tribes do not serve as precedents for similar restrictions upon interstate commerce.8
The decision in the Lottery Case has been discussed at length
because it was in a sense a pioneer decision, because it has had a
profound influence upon the subsequent development of the national police power, and because, in spite of Mr. Justice Harlan's
warning a.ainst making unwarranted deductions from it, it has
been regarded by many as establishing a doctrine regarding the
power of Congress to prohibit various kinds of interstate commerce which is far more revolutionary than it was the expressed
purpose of the court to sanction. It is quite as important to keep
clearly-in mind the things which the Lottery Case does not hold
as it is to remember the things which it does. In the first place,
it does not hold that Congress has the same power to exclude
articles from interstate commerce that it has to exclude them
from importation in foreign commerce. It already has been suggested that this view was urged upon the court by counsel for
the government, but that the decision carefully avoided any
expression of opinion regarding it.0 In the second place, it does
not hold that Congress may exclude anything from interstate
commerce except those commodities the distribution of which
menaces the public health, morals, or safety. Finally, it does not
hold that Congress has the power to exclude harmless and legitimate commodities or transactions from interstate commerce
merely because such exclusions would result in a needed or desirable protection to the public health, safety, or morals. .It does
not, therefore, establish a precedent for the recently invalidated
Child-Labor Law. It merely upholds the exclusion of such comIn re Rapier, (1892) 143 U. S. 110, 12 S. C. R. 374, 36 L. Ed. 93. Ex
parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877.
8 The Lottery Case is severely criticized in an article by W. A. Suther-

land, Is Congress a Conservator of the Public Morals? (1904) 38 Amer.
Law Rev. 194.
9 See first section of this article, 3 'MINiESOTA

LAW

REVIEW 301.
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modities as are themselves by their nature and effects a menace
to the public welfare.
(b) Erclusion of Obscene Matter: The use of the power of
Congress to- regulate commerce for the purpose of suppressing
the circulation of obscene literature or pictures dates back to the
year 1842.10 However, this early statute merely forbade the importation of obscene matter into this country from abroad. As
time went on the scope of this legislation was expanded to include
within its prohibitions not only obscene literature and prints hut
also contraceptive devices, drugs, and information."

But it was

not until 1897 that Congress finally penalized the distribution of
such literature and articles through the channels of interstate
commerce."' With some slight modifications, this statute forms
a part of the present criminal code of the United States.1- The
act contains the two fairly distinct types of prohibition already
in the earlier statutes. In the first place,*it makes it a crime to
deposit with any common carrier for the purpose of interstate
transportation any obscene literature, pictures, images, or articles.
In the second place, it excludes from interstate commerce in the
same way all articles or drugs designed to prevent conception or
to produce illegal abortions and all literature or advertisements
containing contraceptive information or telling where the articles
or infonnation may be secured.
It is quite clear that the purpose of this legislation was to
protect the public morals and not to protect interstate commerce.
Certainly that commerce is in no greater danger of destruction,
loss, or interference from the transportation of obscene literature
than it is from the transportation of Bibles. In passing these
laws Congress aimed to prevent interstate commerce from being
used as a medium for distrilbuting articles or printed matter which
it regarded as morally degrading.
While the Supreme Court of the United States has never
passed squarely upon the constitutionality of this legislation, it
has cited with approval the decision of a lower federal court
which held it valid,' 4 so that the constitutional soundness of such
10 Act of August 30, 1842, 5 Stat. at L. 562, Sec. 28.

11 Acts of March 2, 1857, 11 Stat. at L. 168: March 3, 1873, 17 Stat. at L.
598: March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. at L 489; October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. at L 194.
12 Act of February 8. 1897, 29 Stat. at L. 512.
13 March 4, 1909: 35 Stat. at L 1138. Sec. 245.
14 Hoke v. United States, (1913) 227 U. S. 308, 33 S. C. R. 281. 57 L. Ed.
523.
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use of the commerce power may be said to have passed into the
realm of settled law. That part of the statute which- forbids the
transmission through interstate commerce of contraceptive articles or information was the first to be subjected to judicial
scrutiny, and its validity was sustained by the United States
district court in the case of United States v. Popper.1
The.
statute was attacked primarily upon the ground that Congress
was without constitutional authority to pass it, since it dealt with
the internal affairs of the states and invaded, therefore, the field
of legislative authority reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. The court disposed of the contention with a confident
directness and brevity of argument that is in striking contrast to
the labored treatment which the principle involved usually received in other cases. The power to regulate commerce "includes
power to declare what property or things may be the subjects of
commerce." The power of Congress to prohibit commerce in
certain conmmodities with the Indian tribes has long been recognized. '1 In the License Cases Chief Justice Taney asserted that
the power of Congress to regulate the commerce with foreign
nations conferred the authority to "prescribe what articles of
merchandise shall be admitted and what excluded," and also declared that the power to regulate interstate commerce was equal
in scope to the power to regulate foreign commerce."7 It follows,
therefore, that under its power over interstate commerce Congress has the power to prohibit the transportation of articles
designed for immoral use.
It is interesting to notice that, while the result reached in the
Popper case has been regarded as correct, the theory upon which
the court relied in reaching that result has been tacitly if not
openly discredited. That theory is that Congress may exclude
things from interstate commerce because it may exclude them
from foreign and Indian commerce; and it has already been made
clear s not only that the Supreme Court in deciding the Lottery
Case refused to make any use of the argument that the power of
Congress over foreign and interstate commerce is the same, but
also that a growing body of legal opinion has been won over to
the view that the two powers are quite different in scope. No
1, (1899) 98 Fed. 423.
16 Citing United States v. Holliday, (1866) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 407, 18 L. Ed.
182.
17 (1847) 5 How. (U. S.) 577, 12 L. Ed. 256.
18 Supra, p. 387.
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other case has been found in which the reasoning of the court in
this case has been followed.
That portion of the act of 1897 relating to the exclusion of
obscene literature from interstate commerce was held constitutional in a case in the United States circuit court of appeals in
1914.1' The opinion in this case does not call for extended comment. The contention that congressional authority does not
extend to the prohibition of commodities from interstate commerce was met hy the citation of the cases in which the Supreme
Court had upheld the power of Congress to prohibit the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, digeased cattle, and women
for immoral purposes. The argument that the statute violated
the First Amendment by abridging the freedom -of the press was
disposed of with the succinct remark that "we think that the freedom of the press has enough to answer for without making it a
protecting shield for the commission of crime."
(c) The White Slave Act: In 1910 Congress enacted the
famous Mann Act, which bore the title,- "An Act Further to
Regulate Interstate and Foreign Commerce by Prohibiting the
Transportation Therein for Immoral Purposes of Women and
Girls, and for Other Purposes."20 Here again Congress was not
protecting interstate commerce from any dangers, direct or indirect, which menaced that commerce; the safety and efficiency of
interstate commerce is not dependent upon the private morality
of the passengers on interstate trains. The purpose of the statute
was to strike a blow at the white slave traffic by refusing to allow
interstate commerce to be used any longer as a means of assisting
those who promote the nefarious system of commercialized vice.
The Mann Act was held constitutional by the Supreme Court
in 1913 in the case of Hoke v. United States.2 . The statute was
attacked on the ground that it violated the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States by denying free right
of passage in interstate commerce; that it was a perversion of the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce by exceeding
unduly the proper scope of that power; and on the ground that
it contravened the Tenth Amendment by invading the legitimate
domain of the police power of the states in an attempt to regulate
the private morals of the people.
Clark v. United States, (1914) 211 Fed. 916.
June 25, 1910. 36 Stat. at L. 825.
21227... S. 308, 35 S.C. R. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523.
19
2

0
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In answer to the first objection, the court denied that any
person enjoys a constitutionally protected right to use interstate
commerce for the furtherance of immoral designs. "The contention confounds things important to be distinguished. It urges
a right exercised in morality to sustain a right to be exercised in
immorality. . . . It is misleading to say that men and
women have rights. Their rights cannot fortify or sanction their
wrongs; and if they employ interstate transportation as a facility
of their wrongs, it may be forbidden to them to the extent of the
act of June 25, 1910, and we need go no further.
The court also disposed of the other contentions by declaring the
act to be a proper exercise of the power to regulate commerce.
This being the case its effect on the normal scope of state police
power is quite irrelevant. The court alluded in rather sweeping
terms to the police power which Congress may legitimately exercise through its control over commerce:
"The powers reserved to the states and those conferred on
the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral.
This is the effect of the decisions; and surely if the facility of
interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and
drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic
enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery
of women, and, more insistently, of girls .
..
"The principle established by the cases is the simple one, when
rid of confusing and distracting considerations, that Congress
has power over transportation 'among the several States'; that
the power is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident
to it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to
its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police
regulations."
While the opinion of Mr. Justice McKenna in the Hoke case
rests upon the same principle as that upon which the Lottery
Case was decided, the language used in certain portions above
quoted is broad enough in its implications to sanction the doctrine
that the power to regulate interstate commerce may take the
form of prohibition not merely when such prohibition is necessary to prevent the distribution of commodities or the consummation of transactions in themselves definitely injurious to the
public health, morals, or safety, but it may also take the form of
prohibition, regardless of the character of the things excluded,
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when such prohibition will contribute substantially to the national
welfare. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Mr. Justice
McKenna one of the four who dissented from the opinion of the
majority in the case in which the federal Child-Labor Law was
held invalid ;2_ for his opinion in the Hoke case reflects the view
that Congress has broad authority to use the power to regulate
interstate commerce in any manner which will "promote the
general welfare, material and moral."
(d) Exclusion of Prige Fight Films: In 1912 Congress enacted a law excluding from foreign and interstate commerce and
the mails all prize fight films or pictures.2 3 This was, of course,
merely another attempt to keep the postal service and commerce
from serving as distributing agencies for goods which Congress
regarded as demoralizing in effect.
The only portion of this act which has thus far been attacked
in the courts is that which prohibits the importation of the objectionable films from abroad. This was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in 1915 in the case of Weber v. Freed.24
In this case the court contented itself with the briefest possible
comment on the argument that Congress had exceeded its delegated powers and had invaded the domain of state police legislation; comment which culminated in the statement, "But in
view of the complete power of Congress over foreign commerce
and its authority to prohibit the introduction of foreign articles
recognized and enforced by many previous decisions of this
court, the contentions are so devoid of merit as to cause them to
be frivolous." While the court gave no hint of what its attitude
would be toward the question of the validity of the provision of
the act forbidding the shipment 9 f prize fight films in interstate
commerce, the act is so obviously identical in purpose and constitutional principle with the Lottery Act, the Obscene Literature
Act, and the White Slave Act, as to leave no doubt whatever
regarding its constitutionality.25
22

1101.

Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. C. R. 529, 62 L. Ed.

Act of July 31, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 240.
24239 U. S. 325, 36 S. C. R. 131, 60 L. Ed. 308.
25 In two cases involving the validity of this law, Weber v. Freed, (1915)
224 Fed. 355, United States v. Johnson, (1916) 232 Fed. 970, the lower federal courts argued that Congress could exclude the films from foreign commerce, because its power to exclude objectionable articles from interstate
commerce had been so frequently sustained. Such an argument leaves little
room for doubt as to the views of these courts on the question of the validity
of excluding the films from interstate commerce. After the efforts which
have been made from time to time to prove that the power of Congress to
23
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2. Protection to Public Health. Congress has exercised a
national police power by virtue of its authority to regulate interstate commerce nowher'e more frequently and nowhere with
more general public approval than in the enactment of laws designed to close the channels of commerce to impure, adulterated,
or unhealthful products and.to the possible breeders and carriers
of disease. By far the greater portion of the rather voluminous
legislation of this type which has been placed on the federal
statute books has provoked neither serious discussion regarding
its constitutionality nor actual litigation. And while in a few
instances these laws have been squarely attacked in the courts,
and decisions sustaining their constitutionality have been rendered, there have been other cases in which the court has found
opportunity to give evidence of its approval of such legislation
only in some collateral action. It is appropriate to the purpose
of this article to consider only the more interesting and important
of these laws and the cases construing them, rather than to
attempt an exhaustive compilation. It seems natural to allow
them to fall into two general classes: first, the acts excluding
from interstate commerce impure, unwholesome, or adulterated
food or drugs; and, second, the acts to prevent the spread
through the channels of interstate commerce of disease, infection, or parasites.
(a) E.rclusion of Impure, Unwholesome, or Adulterated
Food or Drugs: The forerunners of the more recent acts excluding these objectionable commodities from interstate commerce
are the laws forbidding the importation of such commodities
from abroad. This power Congress has exercised since 1848.
In that year it passed an act "to prevent the importation of
spurious and adulterated drugs" and to provide a system of
inspection to make the prohibition effective.2
Such legislation
guarding against the importation of unhealthfully adulterated
food, drugs, or liquor has been on the statute books ever since.2 7
In 1887 the importation by Chinese of smoking opium was proregulate interstate commerce is as broad as its power over foreign com-

merce, it is interesting to see the court in the Johnson case arguing the other
way and urging that "the constitutional power of Congress over commerce
extends, not only ta interstate, but to foreign commerce, and what it may do
with respect to the one it may do with respect to the other."
26 Act of June 26, 1848, 9 Stat. at L 237.
27 See the following acts: March 1, 1899, 30 Stat. at L. 951; May 25.1900,
31 Stat. at L. 196; March 2. 1901, 31 Stat. at L. 930; June 3, 1902, 32 Stat.
at L 296; March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. at L. 874; June 30, 1906, 34.Stat. at L. 684.
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"
hibited,2- and subsequent statutes passed in 1 9 0 92' and 1914
made it unlawful for any one to import it. In 1897 Congress
forbade the importation of any tea "inferior in purity, quality,
and fitness for consumption" as compared to a legal standard. "
The constitutionality of this provision was attacked in the courts,
but the act was sustained by the Supreme Court in an opinion
which has become one of the leading cases establishing the power
"
of Congress to prohibit the importation of commodities. 2
Ultimately Congress began to exclude from interstate commerce also various types of adulterated and unwholesome food
and drug products. The earlier laws of this kind were not very
comprehensive. In 1891 an act was passed which provided for
the inspection of all live cattle destined for slaughter and intended
for export or for shipment in interstate commerce, and the inspection of such cattle after slaughter, if that was considered
fiecessary; and cattle or carcasses found to be unsound or disased
were not allowed to be shipped in interstate or foreign commerce.3 However, the shipment of cattle or meat which had
not been inspected at all was not forbidden; a fact which put
very obvious limitations upon the scope and effectiveness of the
act. In 1902 a statute was passed forbidding interstate commerce in all viruses, serums, toxins, antitoxins, and the like, "applicable to the prevention of the diseases of man," except when
28 Act
20
30

of February 23, 1887, 24 Stat. at L. 409.
Act of February 9, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 614.

Act of January 17, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 275. The Supreme Court upheld this statute in Brolan v. United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 216, 35 S. C. R.
285, 59 L. Ed. 541. The court said: "The entire absence of all ground for
the assertion that there was a want of power in Congress for any reason to
adopt the provision in question is so conclusively foreclosed by previous
decisions as to leave no room for doubt as to the wholly unsubstantial and
frivolous character of the constitutional question based on such contention."
31 Act of March 2, 1897, 29 Stat. at L. 605.
32 Buttfield v. Stranahan, (1904) 192 U. S. 470, 498, 24 S. C. R. 349, 356,
48 L. Ed. 525, 536. The conclusiveness with which the court settled the case
will be apparent from the following excerpt from Mr. Justice White's opinion: "Whatever difference of opinion, if any, may have existed or does
exist concerning the limitations of the power [to regulate commerce],
resulting from other provisions of the Constitution, so far as interstate
commerce is concerned, it is not to be doubted that from the beginning Congress has exercised a plenary power in respect to the exclusion of merchandise brought from foreign countries; not alone directly by the enactment of
embargo statutes, but indirectly as a necessary result of provisions contained
in tariff legislation. It has also, in other than tariff legislation, exerted a
police power over foreign commerce by provisions which in and of themselves amounted to the assertion of the right to exclude merchandise at
discretion."
33 Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. at 1- 1089.
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such commerce is carried on by persons holding licenses from
the Department of Agriculture, and except when the products
mentioned conform to standards of purity and effectiveness
A similar law was passed in
established by the department."
1913, applicable to serums used for domestic animals.?s However, in 1906, Congress approached in earnest the problem of
stopping the distribution and sale of impure food and drugs in
so far as its power to regulate interstate commerce gave it
authority to do so; and in that year it passed two comprehensive
'
and far-reaching statutes known as the Pure Fbod Act" and the
3
Meat Inspection Act.

7

It is unnecessary to discuss in detail the provisions of these
acts. The Pure Food Act excludes from interstate commerce
all adulterated and misbranded food and drugs. Its definitions
of the terms "adulterated" and "misbranded" are broad enough
to include practically all unwholesome food and drug products
and those fraudulently compounded or labeled. It seems clear
that Congress had two purposes in mind in passing the Pure
Food Act; one was to "protect the health of the people by preventing the sale of noimally wholesome articles to which have
been added substances poisonous or detrimental to health," the
other was to "protect purchasers from injurious deceits by the
sale of inferior for superior articles." 38 Without attempting to
decide which, if either, of these purposes was paramount in the
congressional mind, it is entirely proper to regard the act as one
which aims to protect the health of the nation.
After the decision in the Lottery Case, it would hardly be
expected that the question of the constitutionality of the Pure
Food Act would prove difficult of solution. Several of the lower
federal courts disposed of the question by reference to the
authority of that case,39 and in the two cases in which the validity
of the act was touched upon by the Supreme Court such validity
seems to have been assumed rather than established by elaborate
34

Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. at L. 728.
35 Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. at L 832.
Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 768.
36
37
Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 674.
38

From the opinion of the court in Hall-Baker Grain Co. v. United
States, (1912) 198 Fed. 614.
39 Shawnee Milling'Co. v. Temple, (1910) 179 Fed. 517; United States v.
420 Sacks of Flour, (1910) 180 Fed. 518; United States v. Seventy-four
Cases of Grape Juice, (1910) 181 Fed. 629. For an elaborate discussion of
the purpose and validity of the Act of 1906. with citation of cases, see Thornton, Pure Food and Drugs, (1912) Part II, Ch. II.
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argument. In the first of these cases, The Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States," the question arose whether the provisions of the
act authorized the confiscation of adulterated food after it had
reached its. destination and was still in the original package.
That there was no doubt in the mind of the court as to the
validity of the law is evidenced by the language used in upholding the right of confiscation claimed by the government. The
court said: "In other words, transportation in interstate commerce is forbidden to them [the adulterated products], and, in
a sense, they are made culpable as well as their shipper. It is
clearly the purpose of the statute that they shall not be stealthily
put into interstate commerce and be stealthily taken out again
upon arriving at their destination and be given asylum in the
mass of property of the state." In the case of McDermott v.
Wisconsi14 1 the point at issue was whether the provisions of a
Wisconsin statute relative to the labeling of food products conflicted with the federal law While the constitutionality of the
Pure Food Act was not squarely attacked, the Supreme Court
took occasion to express itself clearly upon that point. It said:
"That Congress has ample power in this connection is no
longer open to question. That body has the right not only to
pass laws which shall regulate legitimate commerce among the
states and with foreign nations, but has full power to keep the
channels of such commerce free from the transportation of illicit
-or harmful articles, to make such as are injurious to the public
health outlaws of such commerce and to bar them from the facilities and privileges thereof. . . . The object of the statute is to
prevent the misuse of the facilities of interstate commerce in
conveying to and placing before the consumer misbranded and
adulterated articles of medicine or food."
The Meat Inspection Act, as its name suggests, provides an
elaborate system of government inspection of meat before and
after slaughter and during the process of packing, as well as of
the premises on which these processes are carried on, and forbids .the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of meat or
meat products not so inspected. While applicable to a somewhat
different set of conditions, it is quite clear that this statute is
the same in purpose and rests upon exactly the same constitutional principles as the Pure Food Act. The validity of the act
has never been questioned before the United States Supreme
Court.
40
41

(1911) 220 U. S. 45, 30 S. C. R. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364.
(1913) 228 U. S. 115, 33 S. C. R. 431, 57 L. Ed. 754.
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(b) Exclusion to Prevent the Spread of Disease, Infection,
or Parasites: Congress has imposed quarantine regulations upon
foreign and interstate commerce to prevent the spread of human
disease, diseases of livestock, and diseases and pests which attack
plant and tree life. The more interesting and important of these
acts may be briefly mentioned.
It is hardly within the scope of this article to allude .to the
numerous statutes whereby Congress has sought to preveri4, the
introduction of human disease into this country through the
channels of foreign commerce.1 2 During serious epidemics laws
have sometimes been passed to prevent the spread of disease
from state to state by imposing restrictions upon the freedom
of passage in interstate commerce. Thus in 1890 the President
was authorized by law to take such measures as might be necessary to prevent the spread of cholera, yellow fever, smallpox,
43

and the plague.

Much more numerous have been the statutes aimed to prevent the spread of animal diseases through the channels of
commerce. By the act of 1890 the President was given power
to suspend entirely for a limited time the importation of any
class of animals when necessary to protect animals in this country
from diseases. 44 In 1884 the exportation or shipment in interstate commerce of livestock having anV: infectious disease was
forbidden ;45 in 1903 power was conferred upon the Secretary of
Agriculture to establish such regulations to prevent the spread of
such diseases through foreign or interstate commerce as he
might consider necessary ;40 in 1905 the same official was
specifically authorized to lay an absolute embargo or quarantine
upon all shipments of cattle from one state to another when
the public necessity might demand it."

While the Supreme

Court has held unconstitutional such federal quarantine regulations of this sort as have been made applicable to intrastate
shipments of livestock, on the ground that federal authority

42 For existing regulations see Comp. Stat. 1918, Secs. 9150-9182. See
article by Edwin Maxey, Federal Quarantine Laws, (1909) 43 Amer. Law
Rev. 382.
4a Act of March 27, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 31.
44 Act of August 30, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 416.
45 Act of May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. at L. 31.
41 Act of February 2, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 791.
17 Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. at L. 1264.
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extends only to foreign and interstate commerce,4" the general
validity of this type of regulation has been tacitly assumed. 9
A statute of 1905 forbade the transportation in foreign and
interstate commerce and the mails of certain varieties of moths,
plant lice, and other insect pests injurious to plant crops, trees,
and other vegetation. 0 In 1912 a similar exclusion of diseased
nursery stock was made effective, 51 while by the same act, and
again by an act of 1917,r2 the Secretary of Agriculture was
invested with the same powers of quarantine on interstate commerce for the protection of plant life from disease as those above
described for the prevention of the spread of animal disease.
All of this legislation has apparently gone unattacked in the
cofirts, but no doubt can possibly exist as to the congressional
authority to enact it.
3. Protection of the Public Against Fraud. In concluding
the treatment of this general type of national police regulation under the commerce clause, some instances may be
mentioned in which Congress has excluded commodities from
commerce in order to protect the public from fraud and deception. These statutes are included for the sake of logical
completeness rather than because they contribute anything new
to the constitutional principles already discussed.
There is probably no question that the act of 1902 excluding
from commerce food and dairy products falsely branded as to
the state in which they were made or produced" was designed
to prevent frauds upon the consumer rather than to protect him
from any menace to his health. Butter made in Ohio does not
become unwholesome because its label falsely states that it was
made in Illinois; but the statute proceeds on the assumption that
the purchaser has a right to know where it really was made.
As has already been suggested, when Congress passed the
Pure Food Act of 1906" * it desired not only to protect the public
health but also to protect the public from fraud, by making it
possible for persons who receive food or drug products through
foreign or interstate commerce to be reasonably sure of knowing
48 Ill.
Cent. R. Co. v. McKendree, (1906) 203 U. S. 514, 27 S. C. R. 153,
51 L
4 9 Ed. 298.
As in Reid v. Colorado. (1902) 187 U. S. 137, 23 S. C. R. 92, 47 L.Ed.
108, where the Act of May 29, 1884, -supra, was construed and applied.
50 Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. at L. 1269.
-1 Act of August 20. 1912, 37 Stat at L. 315.
52 Act of March 4. 1917. 39 Stat. at L. 1165.
53 Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. at L. 632.
54 Supra, note 36.
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what they were getting. To this end the statute was made to
include detailed provisions regarding the adequate and honest
labeling or branding of food or drugs, and adulterations and false
markings were forbidden even though the products might be
perfectly harmless and healthful. The provisions of the act,
aimed at fraudulent brands and labels, were further strengthened bv the enactment in 1912 of an important amendment which
stipulated that drugs should be held to be "misbranded" if the
"package or label shall bear or contain any statement, design, or
device regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of such
article or any of the ingredients or substances contained therein,
which is false and fraudulent." ' , An effective blow was thus
struck at the advertising methods of the purveyors of "quack"
medicines and nostrums. A still later amendment to the same
act struck at a different sort of fraud by requiring that the net
weight of the contents be marked on packages of food or drugs. 0
Various other statutes have been passed to deny the privileges of commerce to other kinds of fraudulent products. Among
these may be mentioned the act excluding from commerce
"falsely or spuriously stamped articles of merchandise made of
gold or.silver, or their alloys,' '57 the act excluding adulterated or
misbranded insecticides and fungicides, 8 and the recent Grain
Standards Act 59 excluding all grain unless inspected and found
to be of standard grade. None of this legislation calls for extended comment.
When one considers the wide scope of the police power
which Congress has exercised by closing the channels of commerce to commodities and transactions which menace the public
morals, health, and welfare, it is quite natural to let the hfghly
important and salutary purposes which Congress has furthered
by this legislation obscure the precise-and quite limitedmethods by which Congress accomplished these ends. From the
fact that Congress has excluded from commerce articles which
if distributed and consumed would prove dangerous to the public
health, it has been an easy step to conclude that Congress might
55
Act of August 23, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 416. This amendment was rendered necessary by the decision in United States v. Johnson, (1911) 221
U. S. 488, 31 S. C. R. 627, 55 L Ed. 823, which held that the word "misbranded" as used in the Act of 1906 did not apply to false statements as to
the curative properties of drugs.
•!GAct of March 3, 1913, 37 Stat. at L. 732.
57 Act of June 13, 1906. 34 Stat. at L. 260.
58 Act of April 26. 1910. 36 Stat. at L. 331.
50 Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat at L. 482.
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exclude from commerce anything, regardless of its character or
intended use, if by using such exclusion as a club or penalty
there might result a still more adequate protection of the public
health. Whether or not it is logically possible to infer the
existence of this broader national police power from the cases
which have thus far been discussed-and this has proved to be
a highly controversial question-there is small reason to believe
that the courts by which those cases were decided expected or
desired any such inferences to be drawn from them. All that it
is necessary to infer from the statutes and decisions thus far
reviewed is that under its power to regulate interstate commerce
Congress may properly be charged with the responsibility of
seeing that the commerce so committed to its care is not used as
a "conduit" for the distribution" of injurious products or as a
facility for the consummation of injurious transactions.
III.

REGULATIONS BARRING THE USE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
FOR THE EVASION OR VIOLATION OF STATE
POLICE REGULATIONS

It will be noted that in the statutes discussed in the above
section the articles or transactions which .v'ere barred out of
interstate commerce were those which Congress itself regarded
as injurious to the public welfare. A problem which has presented far greater difficulties both for Congress and the courts
has been the problem of how to deal with the interstate transp6rtation of commodities, such as intoxicating liquors, which
Congress, instead of excluding from interstate commerce, has
recognized as legitimate articles of that commerce, 60 but which
have, at the same time, been regarded by some of the states as
so harmful as to warrant the complete prohibition of their production, sale, and even possession. The problem has taken the
form of a dilemma. To allow the individual states at their
discretion to exclude from their borders legitimate articles of
commerce, or to allow them to decide for themselves what
articles of commerce are legitimate and to exclude the others,
60

"By a long line of -decisions, beginning even prior to Leisy v. Hardin,
(1890) 135 U. S. 100, it has been indisputably determined that beer and
other intoxicating liquors are a recognized and legitimate subject of interstate commerce," Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co.. (1912)
223 U. S.70, 32 S. C. R. 189, 56 L.Ed. 355. See the exhaustive citation of
cases in 12 Corpu§ Juris 20.
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would seem to be a reversion to the non-uniform, obstructive,
and wholly unsatisfactory system of commercial regulation by
the states which it was one of ihe primary purposes of the
framers of the federal constitution to abolish forever. On the
other hand, to pour intoxicating liquor through the channels of
interstate commerce into a state which is struggling with the
already difficult problem of making its prohibition laws effective
seems to be very bad policy if not also bad law. Ii has taxed
to the utmost the ingenuity of Congress and, it may be said, of
the courts as well, to steer a middle course between the horns
of this dilemma; to avoid forcing liquor down the throats of
states which do not want it. without sacrificing the vital principle
of uniformity in the regulation of interstate transportation of
commodities. The steps in the development of this problem and
the various efforts which Congress has made to solve it may
properly claim some attention, inasmuch as these efforts may be
regarded as exercises of a national police power under the commerce clause.
1. The Original Package Doctrine.!' That goods imported
from foreign countries do not become subject to the jurisdiction
of the individual states so long as they remain in the original
packages in which they were shipped and have not been merged
in the general mass of the property of the state was settled in
1827.0" But when twenty years later the question was presented
to the Supreme Court in the License Cases 3 whether a state
could prohibit or restrain by the requirement of a license the sale
in the original packages of liquor brought in from other states
or from abroad the court answered that it could. There was no
act of Congress with which the state statutes in question could
be said to conflict, and such regulation of interstate shipments
of liquor, could be held invalid only on the theory that the
grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce was
exclusive and precluded any state regulation on the same subject
even though Congress had not yet exercised its power over it.
The leading opinion, which was written by Chief Justice Taney,
definitely rejected this theory.
61 This problem is treated in detail in the first of a valuable series of
articles by Lindsay Rogers on Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors
Before the Webb-Kenyon Act, (1916) 4 Va. Law Rev. 174.
62 Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678.
6 (1847) 5 How. (U. S.) 504, 12 L. Ed. 256.
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"The mere grant of power to the general government [declared
the chief justice] cannot, upon any just principles of construction, be construed to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise
of any power over the same subject by the states. The controlling and supreme power over commerce with foreign nations
and the several states is undoubtedly conferred upxn Congress.
Yet, in my judgment, the state may, nevertheless, for the safety
or convenience of trade, or for the protection of the health of
its citizens, make regulations of commerce for its own ports and
harbours. and for its own territory; and such regulations are
valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress."
The decision in the License Cases reflects not only the "state's
rights" constitutional principles of the Supreme Court as then
constituted but the very obvious concern of the court at the prospect that the prohibition laws which a number of states were
beginning to enact should be rendered ineffective by a use of
interstate commerce which those states were powerless to
4
prevent.1

With the abatement of temperance zeal which followed the
Civil War, it was more than twenty years before another grist
of state laws purporting to restrain or prohibit the bringing of
liquor into the state through the channels of interstate commerce
claimed the attention of the Supreme Court. In 1888, however,
the court threw consternation into the ranks of the prohibitionists
by invalidating an Iowa statute which punished any railroad
company for knowingly bringing into the state for any other
person any intoxicating liquors without a certificate that the
consignee was authorized to sell them. This was the case of
Bowman s. Chicago ahd Norihzc'estern Ry. Co." It held that
the statute was an attempt to exercise "jurisdiction over persons
and property within the limits of other states" and, furthermore,
"If not in contravention of any positive legislation by Congress,
it is nevertheless a breach and interruption of that liberty of
trade which Congress ordains as -the national policy, by willing
that it shall be free from restrictive regulations." The court did
not cross any unnecessary bridges in the Bowman case, but
merely held that even in the absense of conflicting federal legislation a state could not make it a crime to import an article of
commerce within its borders.
64 An account of this ante-bellum prohibition movement is given in the
Encyclopedia Britannica under Liquor Laws, Vol. XVI, p. 767. 'See also
A. A. Bruce, The Wilson Act and the Constitution, (1909) 21 Green Bag
211.
65 (1888) 125 U. S. 465, 8 S. C. R. 689, 1062. 31 L. Ed. 700.
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While the friends of prohibition in Congress were still
endeavoring to enact sonic sort of statute which would patch up
the havoc wrought by the Boumtian case, 60 a still greater calamity
befell them in the decision of the Supreme Court early in 1890
in'the case of Leisy v. Hardin.17 This case, popularly known as
the Oribginal Packagrc Case, overruled the decision in the License
Cases"8 and held in substance that, even in the absence of congressional regulation of the subject, the police power of the state
could not be exercised to prohibit the bringing of articles of commerce into the state and the selling of those articles in the
original packages. An article of interstate commerce does not
cease to be such until it has either been taken out of the original
package or sold in that package; and until it ceases to be an
article of interstate commerce it is beyond the reach of the state
police power.
"Whatever our individual views may be as to the deleterious
or dangerous qualities of particular articles [said the court] we.
cannot hold that any articles which Congress recognizes as subjects of interstate commerce are not such, or that whatever are
thus recognized can be controlled by state laws amounting to
regulations, while they retain that character. . .
To concede to a state the power to exclude, directly or indirectly,
articles so situated, without congressional permission, is to concede to a majority of the people of a state, represented in the
state legislature, the power to regulate commercial intercourse
between the states, by determining what shall be its subjects,
when that power was distinctly granted to be exercised by the
people of the United States, represented in Congress, and its
possession by the latter was considered essential to that more
perfect Union which the Constitution was adopted to create."
Now it is perfectly clear that if a state cannot' forbid the
shipping in of intoxicating liquors from other states and cannot
forbid the sale of those liquors in their original packages after
they have been shipped in, then state prohibition becomes more
or less of a farce. But close scrutiny of the opinion of Chief
Justice Fuller in Leis, v. Hardin indicated to the friends of prohibition that there might still be a method of bettering this unfortunate plight of the prohibition states. Although it was unnecessary to the decision of the case, the Chief Justice had definitely
'36 These efforts are described by Lindsay Rogers, op. cit., second article,
4 Va. Law Rev. 294.
67 (1890) 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. C. R. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128.
68 Supra, note 63.
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suggested at several -points in his opinion that this incapacity of
the states to protect themselves against interstate shipments of
liquor was due to the fact that Congress had not given the states
permission to exert any authority over such shipments. 9 The
inference from these dicta was perfectly plain: i. e., Congress
might pass an act bestowing upon the states the power to pass
the police regulations applicable to interstate consignments of
liquor, which, in the absence of such permission, the court had
held them powerless to enact. Congress, under pressure from
the temperance forces, proceeded to give the states the desired
permission, and the Wilson Act70 became law within a year after
the decision in Leisy v. Hardin.
2. Congressional Perinission to States to Protect Themselves
from Certain Types of Interstate Commerce. The Wilson Act
provided that "intoxicating liquors . . . . transported into
any State or Territory or remaining therein . . . . shall
upon arrival . . . . be subject to the operation ....

of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise .of
its police power

.

.

.

. in the same manner as though

. . produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise." The Supreme Court promptly sustained the
constitutionality of the act in the case of lit re Rahrer.'1 It is
impossible to enter upon an extended discussion of the highly
00 135 U. S. at page 109: "'Hence. inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation, pirchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is
national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system, so long
as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, or allowing the states so to
do, it thereby. indicates its will that such commerce shall be. free and untrammelled."
At page 110: "If the importation cannot be prohibited without the consent of Congress, when does property imported from abroad, or -from a
sister state, so become part of'the common mass of property within a state
as to be subject to its unimpeded control?"
At page 114: "It cannot, without the consent of Congress. express or
implied, regulate commerce between its people and those of the other States
of the Union in order to effect its end, however desirable such a regulation
might be."
At page 119: ".... the states" cannot exercise that power [to regulate
commerce among the states] %eithoutthe assent of Congress.......
At page 123: *" . . . . the responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the
regulation of interstate onmerce is concerned, to remove the restriction
upon the State in dealing with imported articles of trade within its limits..
which have not been mingled with the common mass of property therein, if
in its judgment the end to he secured justifies and requires such action."
The italics are the author's.
70 Act of August 8, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 313.
71 (1891).140 U. S. 545, 11 S.C. R. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572.
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controversial questions which came up in this case.72 The statute
was attacked primarily on the grounds, first, that in passing it
Congress had delegated to the states a portion of its authority
over interstate commerce; and second, that it estal)lished a regulation of that commerce which was non-uniform in character.
The court denied that the states had been given by the act any
power to regulate interstate commerce. "Congress did not use
terms of permission to the state to act, but simply removed an
impediment to the enforcement of the state laws in respect to
imported packages in their original condition, created by the
absence of a specific utterance on its part," and it is entirely
proper for Congress to "provide that certain designated subjects
of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests
them of that character at an earlier period of time than would
otherwise he the case." The court also denied that the act established a non-uniform regulation of commerce. Congress has
"taken its own course and made its own regulation. applying to
these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule. whose
uniformity is not affected by variations in state laws in dealing
with such property."
There is everv reason to suppose that Congress in passing
the Wilson Act believed that it was giving the states adequate
authority to protect themselves from interstate shipments of
liquor. It was not until the case of Rhodes v. Ioawa 7" was decided
in 1898 that it became clear that the enactment of that statute
and the decision of the Supreme Court sustaining its validity
were but empty victories for the prohibition cause. In that case
the Supreme Court decided that when the Wilson Act provides
that intoxicating liquors brought into a state shall be subject
to the state police power "upon arrival," the word "arrival"
means, not arrival at the state line, but arrival in the hands of
the one to whom they were consigned; and until such arrival
they are exempt from state control or interference.7 4 Under this
72 See the second article by Lindsay Rogers. op. cit., 4 Va. Law Rev. 288;
also A. A. Bruce, op. cit., note 64. The article by Judge Bruce is a vigorous
criticism of the Rahrer case.
73 (1898) 170 U. S. 412. 18 S. C. R. 664, 42 L. Ed. 1088. This case reversed the decision of the Iowa supreme court in State v. Rhodes. (1894)
90 Iowa 496. 58 N. W. 887,24 L. R. A. 245, which held that under the Wilson
Act shipments of liquor from other states became subject to the police
power of the state as soon as they crossed the boundary line of the state.
74 The decision in Rhodes v Iowa had 1-een foreshadowed by the case

of Scott v. Donald (1897) 165 U. S. 58. 17 S. C. R. 265, 41 L. Ed. 632.-see
also Vance v. Vandercook Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 438. 18 S. C. R. 674. 42 L. Ed.
1100,-which held that the South Carolina dispensary system could not ex-
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construction it is apparent that the Wilson Act, instead of giving
the states the virtual right to prohibit the importation of liquor
by allowing them to confiscate it as soon as it reached the state
line, merely gave them the right to forbid the disposition or sale
of the liquor after the interstate carrier had actually delivered
it to the consignee. By such a limitation on the scope of the
prohibitive laws of the state s-o many opportunities for the evasion
of those laws were opened up as to render the Wilson, Act a very
inconsequential gain to the temperance cause.
It may. be noted in passing that in 1902 a statute practically
identical in its terms with the Wilson Act was passed. subjecting
to the police legislation of the states, upon their arrival' therein,
interstate shipments of oleomargarine and other imitations of
butter. 5 This statute has never attracted much attention and it
presents no new constitutional problem.
3. Making Articles Shipped in Interstate Commerce with
Intention to Violate State Laws Outlaws of That Commerce.
(a) The Webb-Kenyon Act: No sooner had the Wilson Act
been emasculated by the decision in Rhodes v. Iowa than agitation was begun in Congress for legislation which would actually
give the prohibition states the protection against interstate shipments of liquor which that measure had been vainly supposed to
provide. The problem, however, was growing increasingly difficult. Grave doubts were raised regarding the constitutionality
of the various proposals for such legislation, but after considerable use of the trial and error method the Webb-Kenyon Bill was
passed by Congress in 1913."6 It was vetoed by President Taft
on the advice of Attorney-General Wickersham, on the ground
that it was unconstitutional ;7- but it was promptly passed over
his veto. The title of the statute described it as "An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate Character in Certain
Cases," and it proceeded to do this by prohibiting (without attaching any penalty) the shipment in interstate commerce of intoxicating liquors "intended, by any persons interested therein, to be
received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used" in violation of

tend its monopolistic control of the liquor traffic in that state to the total exclusion of liquor from other states. See the third article by Lindsay Rogers,
op. cit., 4 Va. Law Rev. 355, dealing with The Narrowing of the Wilson Act.
75 Act of May 9, 1902, 32 Stat. at L. 193. The steps leading up
to the
passage of this act are set forth in the second article by Lindsay Rogers,
op..cit., 4 Va. Law..Rev. 288.
70 Act of March 1, 1913, 37 Stat. at L. 699.
77 The veto message and the opinion of the attorney-general are found
in Sen. Doc. 103, 63rd Congress, 1st Session.
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the law of the state of their destination. Hitherto the states
had been unable to exclude shipments of liquor from other states
because such action amounted to an unconstitutional prohibition
of interstate commerce; under the Webb-Kenyon Act the exclusion of such liquors was made lawful by outlawing those shipments from interstate commerce and thereby depriving them of
that federal protection from state regulation which articles of
interstate commerce enjoy.
The Webb-Kenyon Act was held constitutional by the
Supreme Court in 1917 in the case of Clark Distillinj' Co. v.
Western Maryland Ry. Co.7s The court pointed out that under
the doctrine of the Lottery Case 7'and Hoke v. United States"'
no doubt remained as to the power of Congress to exclude intoxicating liquor from interstate commerce altogether. The objection
raised to the act was not, therefore, "an absence of authority
to accomplish in substance a more extended result than that
brought about by the Webb-Kenyon Law, but . . .. a want
of power to reach the result accomplished because of the method
resorted to." This method was not unconstitutional on the
ground that it delegated power to the state to prohibit interstate
commerce in intoxicating liquors (the argument on which President Taft's veto was based) and thereby permitted the nonuniform regulation of such commerce; the court declared that the
argument as to the delegation of power to the states rested upon
a misconception:

".

.

the will

which causes the pro-

hibitions to be applicable is that of Congress, since the application
of state prohibitions would cease the instant the act of Congress
ceased to apply." In regard to the alleged non-uniformity of
commercial regulation the court declared:

"

. . . . there

is no question that the act uniformly applies to the conditions
which call its provisions into play-that its provisions apply to
all the states-so that the question really is a complaint as to
the want of uniform existence of things to which the act applies,
and not to an absence of uniformity in the act itself." Having
disposed of these objections the court could "see no reason for
saying that although Congress, in view of the nature' and character of intoxicants had power to forbid their movement in interstate commerce, it had not the' authority so to deal with the
subject as to establish a regulation (which is what was done by
78 (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. C.R. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326.
79 Supra. p. 386.
811Supra, p. 390.
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the Webb-Kenyon Law.) making it impossible for one state to
violate the prohibitions of the laws of another through the chan8
nels of interstate commerce." '
(b) The Lacey Act: In 1000 Congress passed a statute making it unlawful to ship from one state or territory to another state
or territory any animals or birds killed in violation of the laws
of the state. s ' It is quite clear that Congress was here using its
power over interstate commerce for the purpose of co-operating
with the states in the protection of wild game and birds. In fact,
the first section of the statute declared frankly that its purpose
was to 'aid in the restoration of such.birds in those parts of
the United States adapted thereto where the same have become
scarce or extinct." It should be noticed that this act differs in
theory from the NWebb-Kenyon Act. because the articles which
are here outlawed from interstate commerce are not articles
which when distributed through that commerce will menace the
public welfare. They are outlawed because of their illegal origin
and possession and because Congress desires to prevent interstate commerce from being used as an outlet or place of refuge
for such illegal commodities. Iy passing the Webb-Kenvon Act
Congress refused to allow itsel f to become an accessory before the
fact, by declining to place the facilities of interstate commerce
at the disposal of those who are about to -violate the prohibition
laws of the states: by passing the Lacey Act Congress refused
to become an accessory after the fact, by declining to place those
facilities at the disposal of those who have just violated the state
law by affording them a means of disposing of their unlawful
possessions. This difference, however, should have no bearing
upon the question of congressional power to -pass the Lacey Act,
and the only court which has passed upon its validity has held it
constitutional83 on the authority of the Rahrer case upholding the
Wilson Act.
Co. case have heen
S1 The Webb-Kenyon Act and the Clark Distilling
widely discussed in the legal periodical literature. The followin" articles
may be mentioned here: 1). 0. McGovney, The \Webh-Kenyon Law and
Beyond, 3 Iowa'Law Bul. 145: S. P. Orth, The Webh-Kenyon Law Decision, 2 Corn. Law Quar. 283: T. R. Powell, The Validity of State Legisla-

tion Under the Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 So. Law Quar. 112: Lindsay Rogers.

The Webb-Kenyon Decision, 4 Va. Law Rex'. 558. Other articles are cited
in the notes to Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on
Constitutional Questions, T. R. Powell, 12 Amer. Polit. Science Rev. 19
et seq,
S2 Act of May 25, 1900, 31 Stat. at L 188.
83 Rupert v. United States, (1910) 181 Fed. 87.
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4. The Reed "Bone-Dry" Amendment. The introduction for
discussion at this point of the Reed Amendment by its popular
title rather than by a caption indicating the principle on which
it is based is a confession by the author of his inability to discover
what that principle is, if there be any. This act was passed as
an amendment to the Postoffice Appropriation Act of 1917.4
The pertinent provision reads as follows: "Whoever shall order,
purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and
mechanical purposes, into any state or territory the laws of which
state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of
intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes shall be punished as
aforesaid." 's5
A casual reading of this statute might lead one to assume
that Congress had merely supplemented the Webb-Kenyon Act
by punishing those who make interstate shipments of liquor
which, in order to divest them of their interstate character, that
act had prohibited without attaching a penalty. What the Reed
Amendment really does is to impose, under penalty of the federal
law. a "bone-dry" policy in the matter of shipments of liquor
from other states upon any state which prohibits merely the
manufacture and sale of intoxicants for beverage purposes. In
other words, the amendment forbids the shipment of liquor even
for personal use into a state which may permit the personal use
of liquor but forbids its manufacture and sale.
The Supreme Court recently upheld the validity of the Reed
Amendment in the case of United States v. Hill. ' It was urged
84 Act of March 3, 1917, 39 Stat. at L 1069. The same act also prohibited sending liquor advertisements through the mails into states which
forbade such advertising. See J. K. Graves, The Reed "Bone Dry" Amendment. 4 Va. Law Rev. 634.
s Italics are the author's.
86 (1919) 248 U. S. 420, 39 S. C. R. 143. In McAdams v. Wells Fargo &
Co. Express, (1918) 249 Fed. 175, the law was enforced against the carrier
and the court said: "It is quite evident that Congress. in adopting said act,
intended to aid the states in the enforcement of their prohibition laws ......

It may be that Congress builded better than it knew in passing the Act of

March 3, 1917; but there is no doubt that it prohibits the shipment of liquor
in interstate commerce for beverage purposes into the dry parts of the state
of Texas wherein the sale of liquor is prohibited by the state law. though

intended only for personal use." In United States v. Mitchell, (1917) 245
Fed. 601, the court,, while not declaring the Reed Amendment unconstitutional, held that the transportation of liquor for personal use in one's own

baggage is not "commerce" and does not therefore fall within the prohibitions of the act. The view is, of course, in conflict with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Hill case.
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upon the court, and the lower court so held, that the prohibition
of the act should be construed to apply only to such shipments of
liquor as were in violation of the law of the state into which they
went.

But the Supreme Court refused to narrow the meaning of
the act in this way. The illegality of the forbidden shipments
of liquor does not depend upon the law of the state, as it does
in the case of the Webb-Kenyon Act, but upon the law of Congress. While Congress may exercise its authority over interstate
cormnerce "in aid of the policy of the state, if it wishes to do so,
it is equally clear that the policy of Congress acting independently
of 'the states may induce legislation without reference to the
particular policy or law of any given state." It is well established that in certain cases congressional regulation of commerce
may take the form of prohibition, and this is an appropriate case
for the exercise of that power. "That the state saw fit to permit
the introduction of liquor for personal use in limited quantity in
no wise interferes with the authority of Congress, acting under
its plenary power over interstate commerce, to make the prohibition against interstate shipment contained in this act. It may
exert its authority, as in the Wiison and Webb-Kenyon Acts,
having in view the laws of the state, but it has a power of its
own, which in this instance it has exerted in accordance with its
view of public policy."
A brief but vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Mr.
Justice McReynolds. He expressed his conviction that the Reed
Amendment "in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce,
but it is direct intdrmeddling with the states' internal affairs.
. . . . to hold otherwise opens possibilities for partial and
sectional legislation which may destroy proper control of their
own affairs by the separate states ....
If Congress may
deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because its manufacture is not permitted there, why may not this be done for any
suggested reason-e. g., because the roads are bad or men are
hanged for murder or coals are dug? Where is the limit?
The Reed Amendment as now construed is a congressional
fiat imposing more complete prohibition wherever the state has
assumed to prevent manufacture and sale of intoxicants."
There is nothing in the majority opinion in the Hill case to
throw any light upon Mr. Justice McReynolds' question, "Where
is the limit ?" The law classifies the states and prohibits the shipment of liquor for beverage purposes into the states comprising
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one of the classes. But there is nothing to indicate that the court
regarded the constitutionality of the law as in any way contingent
upon the intrinsic reasonableness of that classification. Emphasis
is laid upon the fact that Congress could exclude all liquor from
interstate commerce, and the suggestion that the Reed Amendment depends for its prohibitive force upon the existence of any
particular type of state law relating to liquor is repudiated. The
court does suggest that Congress apparently thought it would
be a good thing to impose the "bone-dry" rule upon all states
having more moderate prohibition laws, but this is far from
saying that the statute would not have been an equally legitimate
exercise of the commerce power if the purpose of Congress had
been sorihething quite remote from the suppression of the liquor
traffic. If Congress has full power to stop all interstate traffic
in liquor, but is under no constitutional obligation to prohibit
the shipment of liquor into all states merely because it prohibits
such shipments into some, being free to make the application of
that prohibition depend upon the existence or non-existence of
certain conditions in the states, then may not Congress by turning the interstate spigot on or off, as the needs of the case may
demand, exert a pressure on the states which will lead them to
comply with the "congressional wishes in matters over which
Congress has no direct authority? It is not impossible that Congress has stumbled inadvertently into an unexplored field of
police regulation, although there is small probability that such an
indirect method of exerting police power would ever prove para
ticularly alluring.
Whatever may be the constitutional implications of the Reed
Amendment and the case upholding it, it is impossible to classify
it with any of the types of national police regulation which have
been thus far discussed. It is not an exclusion from interstate
commerce of a commodity which Congress regards as injurious,
to the national health or morals, because Congress does not
exclude all liquor from such commerce, but only that destined for
certain states. Nor is it an act designed to co-operate with the
states in the adequate enforcement of their police regulations
relating to the liquor traffic, because it overrides the wishes of
many of those states and imposes on them a more rigorous-prohibition than they desire. It embodies neither the principle of
positive national control over the interstate shipments of liquor
nor the principle of local option or state home rule embodied
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in the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. It proceeds upon the
somewhat curious theory that Congress ought to impose its own
brand of prohibition not upon all the states but only upon those
states which have seen fit to adopt another sort of prohibition.
From the ground thus far covered it is apparent that the
police power which Congress .may exercise in protecting and
promoting interstate commerce, substantial as that power has
been shown to be, has been overshadowed by the police power
resulting from the efforts of Congress to keep that commerce
from being used to distribute objectionable commodities or to
promote objectionable transactions. The goods or transactions
which may thus be excluded from interstate commerce may be
objectionable either because they are dangerous to the public
morals, health, or welfare, or because they are to be used in
violation of the legitimate police regulations of the state. The
question. which remains for con.ideration is whether or not a
still more extensive national police power may properly be derived
from the commerce clause by allowing Congress to deny the
privileges of interstate commerce to commodities which are harmless in their nature and the use to which they are to be put, but
which are produced under conditions which Congress deems
objectionable. This problem will be dealt with in the concluding
section of this article.
(To be concluded.)
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